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Experience of Awe: An Expansive Approach 
to Everyday Aesthetics
  Thomas Leddy 
Abstract  
As opposed to Melchionne and Naukkarinen, I
defend an expansive definition of everyday
aesthetics, one that includes festivals,
tourism, and many daily activities of artists
and other professionals, along with most
ordinary and common experiences.  I argue
for continuities between aesthetics of
everyday life and the aesthetics of art and
nature.  Looking through a window, for
example, may involve aspects of all three. 
Although I agree with Melchionne that
everyday aesthetics is closely related to
questions of subjective well-being, I take a
more expansive approach to this, drawing
from recent psychological studies of the
experience of “awe” to stress the importance
of such experiences in subjective well-being,
thus tying the high points of everyday
aesthetics more closely with the high points in
the aesthetics of art and nature.
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1.  Background of the debate over defining
everyday aesthetics
When I titled my book on everyday aesthetics,
“The Extraordinary in the Ordinary,” I intended
to counter a prevailing tendency in this new
and growing field to stress the ordinariness of
the ordinary, limiting everyday aesthetics to
this domain.[1]  I thought that this limitation
failed to capture the dynamic interaction
among everyday aesthetics, nature aesthetics,
and art aesthetics.  I wanted to stress the
continuities between these, whereas others
wanted to stress the discontinuities. 
Following John Dewey, I saw the aesthetic
experiences connected with the arts as closely
related to the aesthetic experiences of daily
life.[2]  Art concentrates and intensifies the
aesthetic qualities we find in non-art aspects
of our lives.  Moreover, as Oscar Wilde
observed, non-art phenomena often mimic
art.[3]  Yet often the objects and activities of
everyday life can transcend their ordinariness
even without the mediation of art.  Whether by
the mediation of art or not, ordinary objects
can be seen in a way that gives them
heightened significance, making them,
sometimes surprisingly, objects of awe or, at
least, of fascination.
Often this happens through seeing the object
as an artist would, but sometimes it happens
spontaneously.  Take human beauty.  In every
person’s life, there are a few times when we
glimpse a person of great beauty.[4]  This is
by no means something that happens on a
daily basis.  Yet how shall it be classified?  The
experience fails to fall neatly into the
traditional dichotomy of aesthetics of art
versus aesthetics of nature.  When someone
finds a person to be a “great beauty,” this is
not a matter of nature appreciation any more
than it is of art appreciation.  Natural
aesthetics has to do with natural
environments; great human beauty does not
or, at least, not directly.  There are a number
of other things that happen to us in non-art,
non-nature contexts that are high points in
aesthetic experience, for example, the way
that a smell can evoke a world.  These high
points, I thought, should help to define the
field of everyday aesthetics.[5]
Inspired by Walter Benjamin but not following
him, I called the above-mentioned quality of
heightened significance “aura.”  I defined
aesthetics generally, and aesthetic experience
particularly, in terms of aura.  I did not intend
“heightened significance” to mean a greater
sense of importance but something closer to
“awesome” at its most intense, “fascinating” at
a weaker level, and “interesting” at a still
weaker level.  Something has aura or
heightened significance if it seems more alive,
more real, more present, or more connected
to other things.  I argued that when an object,
event, or experience has an aesthetic quality,
for instance beauty, grace, or elegance, it is
because it has aura. 
However, I was not just interested in special
aesthetic moments covered by such noble-
sounding terms.  I was also interested in the
pervasiveness of aesthetic experience.  To put
it another way, I was not only interested in the
way in which even the most ordinary thing can
become extraordinary, but in low-level
aesthetic experiences such as the pleasure we
get in contemplating a neatened backyard. 
These experiences are as much a part of
everyday aesthetics as the more intense, rarer
sorts of experience, the ones that Dewey
called “an experience.”  In a later paper, I
argued that these exist on a continuum in
which the low-level experiences have aura as
well, although it is less intense.[6]  My
definition of everyday aesthetics was
expansive in that it included the entire range
of this continuum.  For example, following
Sheila Lintott, I would include the sublime
experience of childbirth under everyday
aesthetics, even though it is neither
something that happens every day nor to
every human.[7]  The importance of including
sublime experiences in everyday aesthetics
was highlighted in the last chapter of my
book, in which I discussed everyday aesthetics
and the sublime.[8]
2.  The search for a definition.
Some have argued that the field of everyday
aesthetics is too open-ended, and that the
solution to this is a definition.  In
Contemporary Aesthetics, Kevin Melchionne
and Ossi Naukkarinen have each argued for a
definition that is restrictive; in particular
restricting everyday aesthetics to that which is
ordinary, common and, almost strictly
speaking, daily.[9]  As I have suggested above,
my position continues to take the opposite
tack, one that could be called “expansionist.” 
Is this just a matter of semantics, or arbitrary
choice of category boundaries?  I don’t think
so.  There are deep reasons for the
disagreement and, in what follows, I will try to
tease these out.  My discussion will be
directed here mainly to Melchionne.
Melchionne’s restrictive definition is, in part, a
response to the definition I offered in my
book.  He observed that I treat everyday
aesthetics as a “default third basket for what
is not comfortably categorized as fine art or
natural beauty.”[10]  This is not entirely true,
since I also listed things generally included in
everyday aesthetics.  So part of my approach
was ostensive.  However, the definition I
offered was negative.  I said that everyday
aesthetics covers that which is outside both
art and nature aesthetics.  I now think that the
second, negative, aspect of my approach was
too broad.  First, it is not clear that all non-
art, non-nature aesthetic phenomena should
be included under everyday aesthetics.  For
example, what about the aesthetics of
mathematics?  Is that now a part of everyday
aesthetics since it is not a part of the
aesthetics of art or nature?  Other domains
that pose problems of this sort are the
aesthetics of sports and the aesthetics of
science.  Second, a definition should really get
at a thing’s essential nature or, at least, the
core meaning of the concept.  Negative
definitions do not help with either.  Third, as
we shall see, the relationship between
everyday aesthetics and both art and nature
aesthetics is much too dynamic to be captured
with a negative definition.
However, Melchionne’s problem is not that my
definition is negative but that it is expansive. 
In particular, he is concerned that it would
include things that are not daily or common. 
This is what is meant by favoring a restrictive
definition of everyday aesthetics over an
expansive one.  In this article, I will defend an
expansive definition.  More accurately, I will
defend an expansive approach to
understanding everyday aesthetics, since I am
not going to offer an actual definition. 
Although philosophical definition can be
valuable, the process of creating a
philosophical definition, insofar as it involves
making strict distinctions, tends to hide
continuities and dynamic interactions, the
understanding of which is sometimes more
important than setting up limitations. 
Some might say that the disagreement could
be easily resolved.  All I need to do is cede the
label “everyday aesthetics” to the restrictivists
and coin some other term, say “festival
aesthetics,”[11] to cover the non-everyday
events I had included in everyday aesthetics,
but which they exclude.  Naukkarinen,
agreeing for the most part with Melchionne,
favors an everyday aesthetics that focuses on
things that are familiar, easy, and obvious;
and ordinary routines that can be performed
”almost automatically.”  He further writes that,
“everyday objects, activities, and events, for
me and for others, are those with which we
spend lots of time, regularly and repeatedly. 
Most often this means objects and events
related to our work, home, and hobbies.”[12] 
Like Melchionne, he places parties outside of
the everyday since they break the routines of
life:  “they are exceptions, occasions when we
do other things than the normal."[13]  In the
chart that illustrated his article, “Party”
appeared in the outer circle, whereas everyday
aesthetics relate to what he called “My
Everyday Now,” which is at the center.[14]
The term “festival aesthetics” has a legitimate
use insofar as it can be used to cover such
things as parties, festivals, weddings, and
holidays.  However, “festival aesthetics,” plus
the aesthetic of the common and ordinary,
would not be sufficient to cover the wider
domain I wanted to cover with the term
“everyday aesthetics.”  It would not, for
example, include the above-mentioned
aesthetics of pregnancy and childbirth.  Nor
would it include the delight I had this morning
pointing out to my wife a series of lovely chalk
drawings of animals, perhaps by a child, but
possibly by an artist, that have appeared at
one block intervals near our house.  Since not
clearly art, these drawings may fall within
everyday aesthetics.
I toyed with the term “life aesthetics” for the
broader domain I previously called “everyday
aesthetics,” but rejected it since life also
includes experiences of art and nature. 
“Popular aesthetics” is also problematic since
it would have to cover popular art, which
seems more part of art aesthetics than of
everyday aesthetics.  I continue to prefer
“everyday aesthetics” as the name for the
broader realm.  “The aesthetics of the
common and ordinary” can cover what the
restrictivists want to call “everyday aesthetics.”
As suggested, debates of this sort are more
than a matter of “mere semantics” or efficient
territory organization.  They are aspects of, or
perhaps even proxies for, larger debates.  I
suspect this is true for philosophical debate in
general.  The kinds of concepts philosophers
argue over, such as “art,” “beauty,” and
“good,” are not natural or mathematical
kinds.  They cannot be defined in the way
“water” or “triangle” can. Nor can they be
defined by simply referring to and
generalizing over popular usage.  What is
involved in debates over their definition is
competing visions of larger things.  In this
case, the debate over the definition of
everyday aesthetics entails a debate over the
nature of aesthetics itself, and also a debate,
as we shall see, over the nature of the
everyday.  Moreover, such debates indirectly
deal with more global issues, such as the
nature of knowledge, man, and reality.  That’s
why they are so important to the debaters. 
For example, an argument about the nature of
everyday aesthetics may also indirectly be
about the nature of the good life.[15]  This is
why one can usually describe this kind of
debate in terms of competing ideologies or
worldviews.  Imagine one party gives a Marxist
definition of everyday aesthetics and another a
feminist definition.  If there is a disagreement,
then that is part of a larger disagreement
between Marxists and feminists.  Of course,
teasing out what these larger issues might be
in the long run can be difficult, and it is not
clear that my deeper disagreements with the
restrictivists are the same in each case.  In the
case of Naukkarinen, at least, the larger
debate seems to be that of a Heideggerian (on
his part) versus a Deweyan (on my part) world
view.
3.  Motive of the restrictivists
The restrictivists want to avoid expansion in
the direction of that which is not daily or
common.  Melchionne insists, for example,
that everyday aesthetics should exclude
interior decoration, because engaging in
interior decoration, as opposed to house-
cleaning and neatening, is not a daily activity. 
Now one way we could look at this would be
to see interior decoration as a minor art,
making it then fall under art aesthetics, as
long as art is not identified with “fine art.” 
However, this solution would ignore the
dynamic nature of the interaction between
such literally everyday activities as neatening
up a room and the more rare activities
involved when one hires an interior decorator. 
Melchionne is aware of this interaction, but
wants to keep the two distinct.  Yet a lot of
what goes into amateur collecting,
rearranging, and decoration in one’s home is
pretty close to interior design, although not
professional.  Moreover, it is continuous with
the more daily activity of neatening up, which
itself mainly serves to clarify the boundaries
established in these earlier creative acts. 
4.  Melchionne’s definition
Melchionne defines everyday aesthetics in
terms of four categories, which he uses as
titles to sections of his paper.  They are: 
“ongoing,” “common,” “activity,” and “typically
but not necessarily aesthetic.”  That is, to be
part of everyday aesthetics something must
be ongoing, common amongst most of
humanity, and part of a practice, which itself
may be non-aesthetic.  (For Melchionne,
practices are primary, objects secondary).  We
can see this as a definition in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions, in which
each condition is necessary and the
conjunction sufficient.  It is easy to see the
first three as necessary conditions.  It is
harder to understand how the fourth can be,
but we need not discuss that here.
The activity condition is central to
Melchionne’s definition, since it characterizes
what we are talking about as ongoing and
common.  In emphasizing activity, specifically
the kind involved in a practice, Melchionne
seeks to give primacy to practices over
objects.  However, in the process, he
downplays experiences.  Since there are many
everyday experiences that are not clearly tied
to practices (for example, the humor of seeing
a truck with sides made from a recycled front-
yard fence, something I see on my daily walk),
this restriction is problematic.  Following
Dewey, I give primacy to experiences over
both practices and objects.  Objects are best
understood as aspects of, or elements in,
experience.  After all, we can only analyze
practices and objects insofar as they are
experienced.
Turn now to the “ongoing” condition.  For
Melchionne, “ongoing” means on a daily or
almost daily basis.  Yet why exclude certain
non-daily events, for example, events that
typically happen because it is the weekend
rather than a workday?  That workdays are
usually more numerous than weekend days
does not privilege them as coming under
everyday aesthetics.  Why, for example,
should the Sunday drive be excluded?   Now,
inclusion of the Sunday drive may be easily
conceded by restrictivists under the thought
that it is an ongoing, although not daily,
practice.  Yet it is not the practice that is
aesthetic, it is the experience.  Moreover,
something can be occasional but not ongoing
and still be part of the everyday for the simple
reason that unusual things happen, and we
see, hear, and smell strange things every day.
And what about events that happen every day
or, at least, frequently, but only in certain
contexts and times of year?  For example, I
often contemplate the lights on my Christmas
tree in late December or early January.  I
consider this experience to fall under everyday
aesthetics.  Yet, Melchionne insists that
holidays, and hence holiday decoration and
the practices and experiences involved in
holiday decoration, lie outside everyday
aesthetics; that holidays are seasonal events,
not everyday ones.  However, since every
event occurs during a season, and many are
marked by their seasonal character, to
exclude the seasonal from the everyday would
seem too rigid. 
Similarly, restrictivists would exclude things
we see when travelling as tourists.  Yet isn’t
there an everyday life for the tourist?  And if
you are excluding the non-daily because it is
special, then what about things that happen
on a daily basis that are equally special?  What
about, for instance, the nearly daily
experience I have of seeing rabbits in my front
yard when I go out to pick up the paper,
something that happens because a neighbor
keeps rabbits that constantly escape.  It is
somewhat magical to go out in the morning
and come face to face with rabbits in the
middle of an urban environment.  I would
include this experience within everyday
aesthetics although it is neither daily,
common, nor part of a practice. 
The disagreement may be about what counts
as general for a theory.  Restrictivists may
complain that I am focusing on oddball
examples.  Yet these are examples of things
that give experiences of awe and fascination,
or at least they are interesting.  This kind of
experience, as I have argued, is as
fundamental to everyday aesthetics as it is to
the aesthetics of nature and the aesthetics of
art. 
The question may be asked whether everyday
aesthetics needs to be tied to practices.  That
is, can it also include events that are
serendipitous?  If everydayness is tied
necessarily to practices, as Melchionne seems
to want, then it would exclude, for example,
noticing the amazing way trees look on a city
street when taking a walk at sunset.  This may
happen every day, at least for those who like
to walk at sunset, and yet noticing this is not
part of any practice.  There is a practice of
walking, but that is something different.  One
can, of course, speak of the practice of
looking aesthetically, but this is precisely the
practice that would allow noticing things that
are visually strange or strange to the other
senses.  So if that practice were allowed, then
appealing to practices would be no help for
the restrictivist position.
5.  Problems with the commonality
condition.
More significant are problems with the second
condition, that of commonality.  Bear in mind,
and this is something that both Melchionne
and Naukkarinen are aware of, that what is
typical on a daily basis for one person will be
quite different from what is typical for
someone else.  The everyday life of a Trappist
monk is going to be different from that of
every other cultural type.  One way to resolve
this is to stress what humans share in
common.  Melchionne emphasizes that we all
have to sleep, dress (or at least make
ourselves physically presentable to others),
prepare and eat food, and go out.  The list is
helpful, although it excludes many things I
would consider parts of everyday aesthetics.
 For example, almost all post-puberty people
need to deal with sexual urges, and most
adults need to work on a nearly daily
basis.[16]  Our sexual and work lives should
get as much of a hearing in everyday
aesthetics as our sleeping and eating
lives.[17]  Moreover, there is no need to limit
everyday aesthetics to the small list of
universal practices and exclude the vast range
of narrower practices.
In attempting to explain why our work lives
should be excluded, Melchionne says, “Few of
us are pianists.  Thus, the daily finger
exercises of the pianist are not relevant to
everyday aesthetic theory.”[18]  Yet the
number or percentage of people engaged in
an activity tells us nothing about whether that
activity counts as part of everyday life.  Piano
exercises are an important part of the daily
lives of pianists.  Why exclude these activities
from the everyday, at least relative to pianists?
It might be argued that piano exercises are
part of the aesthetics of music and hence not
a part of the aesthetics of everyday life.  In
response, let’s think about the everyday life of
a typical artist.  As I am more familiar with
visual art, I’ll use the life of a painter in her
studio as my example.  Is the daily activity of
the artist irrelevant to everyday aesthetics? 
Assume that there are no finished artworks in
the studio.  To assume this, at least a
provisional definition of art is needed. An
early version of George Dickie’s definition of
art has the advantage, for our purpose, of
being both well-known and brief:  “A work of
art in the classificatory sense is 1) an artifact
2) upon which some person or persons acting
on behalf of a certain social institution (the
artworld) has conferred the status of
candidate for appreciation.”[19]  On his
definition, there is no art in the room since
the artist, as a representative of the artworld,
has not designated anything there as a
candidate for appreciation, that is, does not
yet consider it ready for viewing.
Even if we assume this definition of art, there
is a lot going on in the studio that has to do
with aesthetics.  Let’s assume that the artist is
painting a still life based on an arrangement
of fruit.  In attending to these pieces of fruit,
the artist attends to their aesthetic properties,
possibly capturing or highlighting them as he
or she represents them.  These properties
could also have been noticed in the kitchen
prior to collecting the fruit for use in the
studio.  In short, the aesthetic qualities
encountered by the artist in the studio belong
to the aesthetics of everyday life. 
Also, in the process of making a work of art,
the artist is attending to the aesthetic
properties of the paints used, especially as
they interact with each other in the perceptual
field both on the palette and on the paint
surface.  In addition, the artist may, at least,
be subconsciously aware of the dynamics of
the relationship between different parts of his
or her body while painting, for example, the
movements of the hands, the use of the eyes,
and so forth.  To exclude any of this from
everyday aesthetics is a mistake.
This is not to confuse everyday aesthetics with
art aesthetics.  Art aesthetics, at least on
Dickie’s account, only comes in after whatever
the artist has created has attained the status
of art.  I am not sure this is right, since even
when there are no designated art objects in
the studio it still seems that there is art in the
studio:  the activity in the studio is art-
making.  So, alternatively, we might want to
extend art aesthetics to include the creative
process that leads to the art product.  But this
would just indicate an overlap between
everyday aesthetics and art aesthetics in the
world of the working artist.  It is this kind of
overlap that is ignored by restrictivist
definitions.  Both art aesthetics and everyday
aesthetics are harmed if each is treated as
isolated from the other. 
Melchionne himself captured some of the
dynamic relationship between the aesthetics
of art and the aesthetics of everyday life when
he wrote that the Japanese tea ceremony
“elevates the everyday to a ceremonial
occasion,” and observed that “[a]fter
participating in a ceremony, if I return to my
daily food preparation with a deeper
appreciation of the utensils, the heating and
pouring of water, the aroma, then the tea
ceremony has improved my everyday aesthetic
life.”[20]  He also captured the ameliorative
aspect of everyday aesthetics, for example,
that paying attention to everyday aesthetics
can improve our lives, to which I will return
later.  My point here is not that the Japanese
tea ceremony is an example of everyday
aesthetics, but that the close relationship
between both art and ritual and everyday
aesthetics is made particularly evident by this
example.   
More complicated is Melchionne’s window
example.  He writes, “a window with a view of
a landscape has no everyday aesthetic value if
the room is rarely occupied or the blind
always drawn.”[21]  Well, of course, the view
has no aesthetic value if it is never seen. 
Neither does the window-as-window have any
aesthetic value if never used.  But what about
the cases in which the room is rarely
occupied?  Consider a mountain cabin, one
with a window with a view, that is visited only
once a year.  On Melchionne’s view, the
aesthetic value of this window with its
attendant view is radically different from that
of a window we look through every day. 
Looking through a window every day is a
practice, whereas visiting one once a year
falls, perhaps, under festival aesthetics. 
Again, on his view, the aesthetic value of the
object and the experience is secondary to that
of the practice.  Nor am I clear how it is less a
practice to look out a window once a year than
every day.
I agree that, as Melchionne wrote, “if the light,
the view, and the bench beside it contribute to
the aesthetic character of some daily moment,
then we may speak of the window in terms of
everyday aesthetics.”[22]  But this is also the
case if these things contribute to the aesthetic
character of a once-a-year experience.  When
he stated, “It is the regular morning coffee,
the acknowledgement of the evening sunset,
or the mere raising of a blind after waking
that imparts everyday aesthetic value to the
window,”[23]  I again agree, but there are
other, less regular, contributors as well. 
Everyday aesthetic value also comes from
what is unique to the window, for example, its
design, and to the experience, for example,
what is seen through the window on that day. 
Moreover, each instance of these things, each
particular event involving the regular morning
coffee and also, perhaps, raising the blind
after waking, can itself take on an aura of
heightened significance, that is, can be
aesthetic. 
The issue of the window with its view leads
me to think of a related issue in the aesthetics
of nature.  Just as we have seen that the
relation between aesthetics of art and
aesthetics of everyday life is best seen as
dynamic, so too we find this in the relation
between the aesthetics of nature and both the
aesthetics of art and the aesthetics of
everyday life.  Recognition of this has
profound implications for aesthetics in
general.  A window with a view of a landscape
is, in itself, not nature, and yet looking out of
the window to see a landscape is a matter of
appreciating nature and, from a different
angle, a matter of everyday aesthetics.  It also
relates to the aesthetics of art by way of the
art of architecture.  Someone might argue that
appreciating nature through a window is not
appreciating nature as nature but rather is
appreciating it as though it were a
painting.[24]  Yet such appreciation is
acceptable as long as it is not considered the
only way to appreciate nature.  It might be
thought that walking in nature is a more
authentic or more appropriate way to
appreciate nature than viewing it through a
window.  But this really depends on how often
and how carefully one does the viewing. 
Viewing through a window is one of the many
ways we appreciate nature.  The aesthetics of
nature should be broad enough to handle this
kind of appreciation. 
But appreciation of nature is not the whole of
this story.  Awareness of the window, its glass,
its frame, its structure, its solidity, its
architectural placement, and so on, may also
be an important feature of one’s overall
experience.  Appreciating a landscape through
a window, then, is an aspect of appreciation of
the art of the architect as well as an aspect of
nature appreciation.[25]  The experience of
viewing both the window and the scene
through the window is art-related and
nature-related.  It is also everyday aesthetics-
related to the extent that both the art-related
and nature-related aspects are contextualized
within the everyday activity of “looking
through a window.”  In short, the everyday,
the natural, and the artistic are often
intertwined in complex ways. 
Moreover, limiting everyday aesthetics to
practices that are daily or nearly daily fails to
recognize that there are ideals of everyday
aesthetics not met in a regular or ongoing way
that are important in the definition of
everyday aesthetics. Examples of such ideals
include what Dewey referred to as “an
experience,” and experiences of awe that are
also aesthetic. 
6.  Subjective well-being and awe
Melchionne has more recently argued that
subjective well-being is the goal of everyday
aesthetics.[26]  This could be seen as
representing an ideal, but how is subjective
well-being achieved?  Melchionne thinks it
best achieved through hedonic regulation.  I
applaud the idea that subjective well-being is
enhanced by greater attention to everyday
aesthetic phenomena.  However, I am
skeptical of exclusive emphasis placed on
hedonic regulation.  I have already mentioned
the importance of the concept of awe.  There
is recent psychological evidence to support
the idea that subjective well-being is
increased by moments of awe.[27]  As
psychologists have observed, experiences of
awe often come from experiences of great
beauty or sublimity in art and nature.  It
seems then that there is something
problematic about Melchionne’s claim that,
“Everyday aesthetic practices of our own
design stand a much better chance of
influencing well-being than the occasional
encounter of high or popular art, such as
attending museums or concerts from time to
time.”[28]  Practices of our own design are
only one factor in life-enhancement.
 Experiences of awe can come from nature,
art, or everyday contexts. 
I argue that we should treat everyday
aesthetics, art aesthetics, and nature
aesthetics on an equal footing when it comes
to promoting well-being.  First, our
encounters with popular art, at least in
industrialized countries like the United States,
are hardly occasional and, in fact, take up a
large part of most people’s days.  Second,
although experiences of awe are occasional,
they are hardly rare.  Moreover, it is arguable
that such experiences are a large part of what
gives life meaning.  Further, although such
experiences are often induced by art and by
nature, they are also often induced in non-
art, non-nature contexts. 
It might be replied that talk about awe is just
another way to talk about the high end of the
hedonic scale.  But awe, and the closely
related concept of fascination, do not simply
mark the highest level of pleasure.  Rather,
like sublime experiences, they have other,
sometimes negative or disturbing elements or
aspects and although pleasurable in some
sense, the pleasure is complex.
But is awe aesthetic?  It can be, although it
does not necessarily have to be.  The
dictionary defines it as "overwhelming wonder,
admiration, respect, or dread."[29] There
doesn't seem to be a pleasure or delight
component required here in the way that
Burke required “delight” for the sublime to be
aesthetic.[30]  However, wonder, admiration,
and respect might each  have its own
associated positive affect, and while I cannot
personally imagine dread having a positive
component, this may be because I am not
religious.  Dictionary.com suggests that the
current sense of awe as involving “dread
mixed with veneration” is because of its
biblical use with reference to God.[31]
 Veneration can have a positive affect
component, and any dread that a believer has
towards God must be combined with some
positive affect, for example, love.  Otherwise,
why worship Him?  However, if awe were
defined as simply a combination of fear and
surprise, as some have done,[32] then it could
only be tangentially related to aesthetics,
unless of course the surprise aspect also
contains within it a delight aspect.  Also,
psychologists have observed that when people
describe experiences of awe, those
experiences are usually considered positive.
More like the work of some contemporary
aestheticians, such as Denis Dutton, Stephen
Davies, and Ellen Dissanayake on art,
psychologists Piff and Keltner give an
evolutionary account of the experience of
awe.[33]  For them, awe motivates people to
take part in community-building,, such as
"collective rituals, celebration, music and
dance, religious gatherings and worship,"[34]
and may be adaptive for this reason.  All of
these community-building events have strong
aesthetic components.  So perhaps awe is one
of the important aesthetic phenomena related
to, although somewhat broader than, the
sublime.  Some might balk at this mixture of
the aesthetic and the religious, although it is
often also present in the sublime.  But in tribal
societies, from which all non-tribal peoples
are descended, the arts, like music, dance,
and ritual are not clearly distinguished.  So
the distinction may be relatively recent, and
relatively unimportant, when discussing
aesthetics broadly.
The psychologists I refer to associate awe with
shifting focus from narrow self-interest to
community well-being. 
Evolutionary aestheticians have often seen the
arts, or the skills that go into art, as bringing
communities together, thus giving these
communities an adaptive advantage.  Awe,
and whatever gives rise to awe, might be
adaptive in this sense.  All of this relates to
the broader issue of the relation between
aesthetics and ethics.  If everyday awe is
closely associated with ethics, then there is a
stronger relation between the two than we
may have thought.[35]  Piff and Keltner stated
that in one experiment they found that
participants who reported experiencing more
awe in their lives, and who felt more regular
wonder and beauty in the world around them,
were kinder to strangers.  Experiences of awe
might make one feel more expansive and less
driven to satisfy immediate personal needs.
Piff and Keltner also suggested that our
culture is awe-deprived in that we spend
more time working and less time outdoors
and with others.  Young people today are
missing the camping trips and the starry
heavens many older people experienced when
young.  Kant said, “Two things fill the mind
with ever new and increasing admiration and
awe, the oftener and the more steadily we
reflect on them: the starry heavens above and
the moral law within.”[36]  Piff and Keltner
argued that in experiencing awe while looking
at the starry heavens, we are more inclined to
follow the moral law, or at least to help
others. 
Piff and Keltner observed a decline
in attendance at arts events along with a
decline in funding for arts programs in the
schools, concluding that "awe deprivation has
had a hand in a broad societal shift ...over the
last 50 years,” in that “people have become
more individualistic, more self-focused, more
materialistic and less connected to
others."[37]  It is hard to measure this, and
one would have to be careful in defining the
key terms.  The consequence, however, if true,
is that aesthetics, including everyday
aesthetics, may be more important for our
cultural survival than many currently believe. 
Piff and Keltner concluded that, to reverse the
trend, people should experience more
everyday awe, actively seeking out “what gives
them goose bumps, be it looking at trees,
night skies, patterns of wind or water or the
quotidian nobility of others...."[38]  
Promoting this would be an important goal for
everyday aesthetics, but only under the
expansive definition.
To stress the ordinary over the extraordinary
and the common over the awe-inducing in
everyday aesthetics is like judging art by its
most mundane examples and not by its
masterpieces.  The equivalent to the
masterpiece in everyday aesthetics is what
Dewey referred to as “an experience,” which is
associated with what we have called awe.[39] 
Everyday aesthetics can have (should have!) a
normative dimension in the sense of providing
high points, things towards which it can
aspire.  It can aspire to increasing the
pleasures and diminishing the pains in our
lives not only quantitatively, as suggested by
Melchionne’s Bentham-like emphasis on
hedonic regulation, but also by maximizing
moments of awe.  Moments of awe, however,
are not activities or practices.  This is true
even though one can cultivate gaining these
experiences, as in the Buddhist practice of
mindfulness.
7.  The “Garbage Moment”
The point of disagreement between
Melchionne and me can be highlighted by
looking at his discussion of taking out the
garbage.  He writes that this is “an everyday
activity for nearly every one, but it is not
typically an aesthetic activity.  It would be
bizarre to embellish it with ceremony.”  He
admits it is possible to conceive of it
aesthetically, but  that “what matters is not
the logical possibility of a quality but, instead,
its typicality.”[40]
Agreed, taking out the trash is not typically
considered an aesthetic activity or as
something that can have a positive aesthetic
quality.  But should this exclude it from
everyday aesthetics?  One of my favorite comic
strips, Rose is Rose,[41] frequently has one of
the lead characters, the husband “Jimbo,”
experiencing what he calls his “garbage
moment.”  When he takes out the garbage, he
contemplates the stars, the universe, and life. 
For him, taking out the garbage has a
profound aesthetic character; perhaps it is
sublime.  Moreover, and because of this, there
is a certain ceremonial quality to his taking
out the garbage. 
I agree with Melchionne that it would be
bizarre to embellish taking out the garbage
with an actual ceremony, for example, reading
certain verses, lighting candles, or making it
into something like the Japanese Tea
Ceremony.  However, it isn’t bizarre to
sometimes stop while taking out the garbage,
look into the sky, and think about one’s role
in the universe.  Nor is it just the thinking
about the universe that provides the
experience of awe.  The awe of the “garbage
moment” emerges from the experience as a
whole. 
Of course part of the experience is the irony
that it involves something normally
considered a lowly chore.  After all, Rose is
Rose is a comic strip, and it is somewhat
funny that Jimbo has garbage moments.  Still,
humor does not exclude the aesthetic. 
Moreover, it is not clear that seeing taking out
the garbage in an aesthetic way or in
connection with an experience of awe is a bad
thing. 
In a similar way, Thich Nhat Hanh, following
the tradition of Buddhism, encourages us to
experience washing dishes through what he
calls “mindfulness.”[42]  "While washing the
dishes one should only be washing the dishes,
which means that while washing the dishes
one should be completely aware of the fact
that one is washing the dishes."[43]  This
could be misinterpreted to mean that one
should just concentrate on the truth of the
proposition, "I am washing dishes."  Rather, it
means that one should be conscious of one's
every action in washing dishes while washing
dishes.  Maybe one should be conscious of the
dishes too, as they are part of the total
experience, and of their aesthetic properties,
although Hanh mentions nothing about
this.[44]
Similarly, in describing mindful drinking of
tea, Hanh writes, "Drink your tea slowly and
reverently, as if it is the axis on which the
whole earth revolves - slowly, evenly, without
rushing toward the future.  Live the actual
moment.  Only the actual moment is life."  In
my view, this way of drinking tea would allow
one to concentrate on the aesthetic qualities
of the tea, of the moment as experienced, and
also of one's own actions.[45]  The aesthetic
demand, like that of the Buddhist, is to notice
the now...to live.  As Hanh writes, "Drinking a
cup of tea becomes a direct and wondrous
experience in which the distinction between
subject and object no longer exists."[46]  If
that happens, the experience is not ordinary
or common, and yet the ordinary is elevated
and intensified.
Melchionne follows up his point about taking
out garbage by stating that an everyday
practice is not made aesthetic by some
“counter-intuitive transfiguration or leap of
creative re-invention,” similar to what
happened when Duchamp created Fountain. 
True, but nothing so counter-intuitive or
avant-garde is needed to have a “garbage
moment.”  Having a garbage moment is not a
matter of turning something ordinary into a
work of art.
Dewey urged us not only to notice the
aesthetic properties of a great storm or a
marvelous restaurant dinner but also the fire
in a fireplace and the aesthetic satisfaction a
mechanic takes in a job well done.  In my
book, I stressed the value of taking an
aesthetic attitude towards such ordinary
everyday things as shadows of trees on
sidewalks.  Sherri Irvin has similarly
emphasized taking such an attitude towards,
for example, observing her cat or even the
way she sits and breathes.[47]  These latter
things do not take us beyond the stream of
daily life, but they do involve taking a
different attitude towards that stream.[48] 
8.  Conclusion
In conclusion, I have questioned Melchionne’s
and Naukkarinen’s restriction of everyday
aesthetics to “the aspects of our lives marked
by widely shared, daily routines or patterns to
which we tend to impart an aesthetic
character.”[49]  Although I admire that they
have brought our attention to such things, I
argue that things not so widely shared and not
so daily, usual, or common may also fall
under everyday aesthetics.  An expansive
definition of everyday aesthetics is needed
because hedonic adjustment is not sufficient
for subjective well-being; we also need
moments of awe.  This can be provided in part
by aesthetic experiences of art and nature. 
However, if we take the path of Jimbo or
Hanh, these moments of awe may also arise
out of ordinary experiences of everyday life,
given the right perspective or training.  Let’s
avoid everyday aesthetics as a mere third
basket for things that are not art or nature. 
But also let’s not be too restrictive or too
bound to the value of that which is easy and
comfortable to recognize the value of the
strange, the interesting, the fascinating, and
the awesome in everyday life.  Searching for
this may make life, as Nietzsche would put it,
worth living.  If you define everyday aesthetics
in a restrictive way you limit life itself.[50]
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